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1. Introduction 
 The rapid expansion of online betting in the last twenty years has resulted in a 
transformation in the financial scale of global soccer betting markets, with billions of 
dollars traded on a weekly basis (Forrest, 2006, 2012) between a heterogeneous 
population of bettors and bookmakers. At the same time, the market has been 
characterised by transformative structural change, fuelled by the significant incursion 
of new entrants with distinctive behaviours in terms of operating principles and 
practices.   A recent paper (Grant, et al. 2019) charts this change and suggests that 
traditional bookmakers, referred to as ‘position taking bookmakers (PTBs)’ are now 
being challenged by a new strategic group of ‘book balancing bookmakers (BBBs)’.   
In addition, market expansion has coincided with prices offered by bookmakers 
becoming increasingly competitive (Forrest, 2012), which has attracted 
sophisticated, price sensitive bettors who seek to take advantage of new ‘investment’ 
opportunities. Due to the ease, and relatively low-cost of shifting capital between 
online bookmakers, these bettors are likely to seek out arbitrage opportunities. In 
fact, Grant et al (2019) found that the different product portfolios and operating 
behaviours of the PTBs and BBBs have led to the creation of market inefficiencies, 
with theoretically highly profitable opportunities for arbitrage. At the same time, 
however, Grant et al. (2019) present evidence that the PTBs operate a practice of 
deterring or refusing bets from informed bettors, preventing arbitrage opportunities 
from being exploited; leading to the concern that these important expanding markets 
may remain inefficient.  
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Given the above context, a natural area of enquiry within the industrial 
organisation tradition is how structural upheaval, in the form of disruptive new entry, 
affects conduct, in terms of the emergence of behaviourally-distinct strategic groups, 
pricing and group interaction. This, in turn, raises the issue of how pricing behaviours 
and outcomes impact on overall market performance in terms of efficiency, where a 
key question is whether, despite barriers to trade, markets have the capacity to 
accommodate information embodied in the decisions of sophisticated investors, 
thereby driving prices towards efficiency.   
 BBBs act like market makers in other forms of financial market, effectively 
matching buyers with sellers by adjusting their odds according to the amounts traded 
on different game outcomes. As a result, their profit is a function of generated turnover 
and their prices reflect a volume-weighted average of the public’s opinion, potentially 
dominated by ‘smart-money’. PTBs on the other hand, attempt to maximize their profit 
margin from a large customer base, deliberately filtered to avoid ‘informed bettors’ 
(Grant et al. 2019). 
We contend that informed bettors are more likely to bet with BBBs, ensuring 
that their final odds represent more efficient predictors of match outcomes than the 
closing odds of PTBs. However, whilst PTBs operate policies that deter informed 
bettors, they may realise that these bettors hold information that can inform the setting 
of appropriate prices. They, therefore, may operate a low risk, low cost policy of 
capturing this information; moving their own prices in the direction of BBB’s prices. 
This strategy would enable them to capitalise on the informed bettors’ information, 
without risk of their profits suffering from large, informed bets. Consequently, the 
overall efficiency of the European soccer betting market may be less compromised 
than the restrictive practices of the BBBs might imply. 
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 It is evident that the, largely online, BBBs are willing (and explicitly so) to accept 
large stakes from informed traders and typically employ a relatively low overhead, low-
margin, high-turnover strategy. To make this a financially viable strategy, they will 
actively manage their book to ensure that liabilities across outcomes for an event are 
relatively equalized (‘book-balancing’). This will ensure that their profits on a given 
event will roughly equal the transaction costs incorporated into their odds, so that 
profits are assured regardless of the event outcome. 
Traditional, ‘position taking’, bookmakers, generally have long-standing 
reputations and generally cater for recreational (less informed) bettors. These 
bookmakers include those that provide physical-world betting services (i.e., betting 
shops). They actively encourage new accounts with small account opening bonuses 
and advertise low-probability (and low-liquidity) bets. The greater physical-world 
presence (and associated overheads) means that these bookmakers cannot replicate 
the low transaction costs (over-rounds) of their exclusively online competitors, and 
operate relatively low turnover, high-margin strategies.  
With a target market of unsophisticated clientele, and relatively high margins, 
the PTBs have less incentive than BBBs to change their odds frequently and they have 
less incentive to maintain a balanced book. Based on the belief that they generally 
have superior information to their customers, they set odds to deliver a high margin, 
and to maximize profits over time. We argue that even PTBs will change prices in 
response to public information (when they believe this represents new information) to 
avoid excessive imbalance in their book. However, we contend that their high over-
rounds permit them to change their odds less frequently than those of the BBBs.  
To explore these issues of market behaviour and performance in the light of 
structural change, we compare the evolution and efficiency of prices in European 
4 
 
football betting markets of a major online BBB with those of a major UK-based PTB 
for all matches played in six major European leagues for a whole season. We find that 
the odds of the BBB change far more often during the active market than those of the 
PTB. In addition, we show that lagged odds changes at the BBB are significant 
predictors of the odds changes at the PTB, but not vice-versa. Equally, we show that 
the closing odds of the PTB are a function of the day-ahead odds of the BBB, but the 
day-ahead odds of the PTB do not significantly affect the BBB’s closing odds. These 
findings are consistent with the trades of informed bettors moving prices at the BBB 
and this information then diffusing to the PTB. In addition, we find that the odds of the 
BBB (cf. the PTB) better forecast match outcome and that closing prices are more 
efficient predictors of match outcomes than those observed 24 hours prior to kick-off, 
for both types of bookmaker.  
Taken together, the results confirm that informed bettors trade with the BBBs, 
and that their bets reveal new information about game outcomes over time. Equally, 
the results suggest that the information held by sophisticated traders also informs 
prices of PTBs, even though they are deterred from betting directly in these markets, 
thereby driving the prices of both strategic groups of bookmakers towards efficiency. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature 
concerning the behaviour of bookmakers and bettors and this is employed in Section 
3 to develop appropriate hypotheses. Details of the data set employed, the nature of 
the specific bookmakers whose odds are examined and the methodology we employ 
to test the hypotheses are presented in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5. 
A discussion of the implications of the results and suggestions for future research are 




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Bookmakers’ Behaviour – Theory and Evidence 
Position Taking Bookmakers 
Several authors suggest that bookmakers take positions and set prices in order 
to maximize their expected profit. For example, Levitt (2004) argues that bookmakers 
are better at predicting game outcomes than the typical bettor and that they set prices 
in order to exploit this advantage. This can yield greater profit than could be obtained 
if the bookmakers acted like traditional market makers and attempted to set prices to 
balance supply and demand. Evidence that some bookmakers `take a position’ is 
provided by Levitt (2004), Paul and Weinbach (2007, 2008) and Humphreys (2010).  
Kuypers (2000) argues that such bookmakers seek to maximize profits and can 
even set odds that deviate from those indicated by unbiased probability estimates if 
they come to different conclusions regarding how bettors place their bets. Similarly, 
Marshall (2009) suggests that bookmakers could remove odds discrepancies with 
competitors, but often do not if they believe that their own odds better reflect the 
outcome probabilities; suggesting that the objective of bookmakers’ price-setting is to 
maximize profit rather than remove risk. Equally, Franck, et al. (2013) suggest that 
PTBs purposefully quote some odds above those of their competitors as a loss-leader 
strategy to attract customers, a policy consistent with the theory of spatial price 
dispersion (Marshall, 2009)1. Whilst this strategy does not necessarily maximize their 
profit per game, and may involve accepting bets with a negative expected value, it 
may be consistent with maximization of long-term profit. As Grant et al. (2019) point 
out, these bookmakers often refuse bets from those they discern to be informed 
 
1 Interestingly, price dispersion remains persistent in the internet age (Baye et al, (2004) and Baylis and Perloff 
(2002)) find that some online sellers persistently offer both high prices and poor services). 
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customers. Consequently, their policy of maximizing the customer base should 
maximize their long-term profits.  
 
Book Balancing Bookmakers 
An alternative operating model is that bookmakers set prices to eliminate risk by 
balancing the potential liabilities across all possible outcomes; guaranteeing their 
payoff is close to their over-round, irrespective of event outcome (advocated by Sidney 
(2003), in a text designed to educate bookmakers). Magee (1990) also states that 
bookmakers adjust their odds regularly, in order to achieve a balanced book, their 
odds reflecting the money staked on each possible outcome (Woodland and 
Woodland, 1991). Theoretical models of bookmaker behaviour also often take this 
perspective (e.g., Fingleton and Waldron, 1999;  Hodges and Lin, 2009) According to 
this business model, bookmakers effectively act as market makers whose profits are 
merely a function of the volume traded.  
From the bettor’s perspective, a BBB offers a similar form of market to a betting 
exchange, where trades are conducted directly between the different bettors, the 
betting exchange (which facilitates the transaction) obtaining a commission from the 
winner. A similar mechanism operates within a BBB, with the BBB effectively acting 
as an intermediary, receiving a small share of turnover in exchange for providing 
liquidity to match competing bettors’ orders. The bookmaker-driven football betting 
market offers significantly greater liquidity than the comparable betting exchange 
market (Franck et al., 2013; Duffie, 2012)  
 
2.2. The Population of Bettors 
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The betting public is heterogeneous (Gainsbury, et al. 2012) but for the purpose of our 
study, we distinguish between two types of bettors; namely, the casual betting public, 
whose bets exhibit negative average expected returns, and a much smaller group of 
informed bettors whose expected returns may be positive. The latter group may 
include bettors who (i) possess inside information (Shin, 1991, 1992, 1993) and whose 
existence in the football market has been observed by Forrest (2012); (ii) arbitrageurs; 
i.e. those who attempt to benefit from pricing differences across different betting 
operators (e.g., Marshall, 2009; Franck, et al., 2013), and (iii) bettors who successfully 
apply mathematical models to profit from betting (e.g., Benter, 1994; Thorp, 2000).  
Grant et al. (2019) suggest that BBBs restrict trade with those bettors whom 
they believe to hold superior information, by implementing restrictions on the size of 
stake or type of bet they are willing to accept (e.g. restrictions on arbitrage betting), or 
simply cancelling traders’ accounts (Veitch, 2009). Franck et al. (2013) identify 
potential arbitrage opportunities between odds of BBBs and PTBs and between betting 
exchanges and bookmakers’ odds. However, Grant et al. (2019) argue that these arise 
because PTBs intentionally misprice events in order to attract customers and these 
are effectively non-exploitable in the long-run because PTBs restrict the activity of 
those skilled in identifying these opportunities. Marshall (2009) found the median 
period for arbitrage opportunities to exist in football markets to be 15.4 minutes. If price 
dispersion were not intentional, it is likely that these opportunities would be quickly 
removed. The fact that they are not, provides further evidence that PTBs apply 
discriminatory policies against skilled bettors. Furthermore, Levitt (2004), analysing 
bettor-specific data from a PTB, found little evidence of individual bettors who 




Conversely, for a BBB the objective is to maximize trading volume, as this is 
the only determinant of such an operator’s profitability (Woodland and Woodland, 
1991). Hence, a BBB has no incentive to eliminate potentially successful bettors, as 
BBBs take no position against them2. It might not even be possible for a BBB to discern 
whether a large bet arises from a professional gambler, from a regional PTB 
bookmaker, or from an insider (Forrest, 2012).  As successful bettors are likely to apply 
reinvestment strategies, their stakes on individual games are likely to grow over time 
until they are bound by the market’s staking limits (applied by BBBs to manage the 
ratio of volume from informed vs. less informed clients). Consequently, informed 
clients are likely to be significant suppliers of liquidity for a business model in which 
trading volume is the decision variable.  
Since BBBs allow bets from informed traders, they use regular movements of 
odds to minimize potential exposure, as they set limits on the size of the stake that 
they are willing to accept at a given level of odds. In addition, they reduce the odds on 
whichever outcome receives a sizeable bet and increase the odds correspondingly on 
other outcomes. The result of this process is that the BBB secures a profit somewhat 
lower than the over-round, since the stakes on all outcomes might be higher when the 
corresponding odds were above the average level for a given offer during its life cycle. 
It is also likely that a greater decrease in the odds will occur after a bettor identified as 
skilled places a large bet (Forrest, 2012).  
 
3. Theoretical Context and Development of Hypotheses 
 
 
2 Pinnaclesports a major bookmaker following this business model states on its website “our success derives 
from the economy of scale that a high volume of bets generates – think Walmart or Tesco. This approach 





Levitt (2004) argues that it should be expected that “the most talented individuals 
would be employed as the odds makers” (p. 245) and, as a result, bookmakers (cf. 
bettors) will be able to forecast event outcomes more accurately. This suggests that 
PTBs set odds that efficiently reflect the corresponding event probabilities. 
Consequently, he argues, they do not have to adjust these odds often in order to 
balance their books, as taking positions will deliver higher profits. Accordingly, 
bookmakers that very frequently adjust their odds on the basis of trading volume, do 
not fit Levitt’s model; rather they might better be described as a BBB. So, for Levitt 
(2004), PTBs are superior forecasters of outcomes relative to BBBs. However, Smith, 
et al. (2006, 2009) and Franck et al. (2010, 2013) provide evidence that odds derived 
from betting-exchange markets constitute superior forecasts of match outcomes (cf. 
bookmaker markets), suggesting that demand-driven markets evaluate the outcomes 
of sport events better than the expert bookmakers. Kuypers (2000) and Forrest and 
Simmons (2008) suggest this difference in efficiency could be attributed to inefficient 
price-setting by bookmakers, as they try to take advantage of punters’ irrational betting 
or by bookmakers’ loss-leading activity, which creates such inefficiencies intentionally 
in order to maximise long-term profit. They have no incentive to adjust their odds in 
response to demand, even if this results in the generation of arbitrage opportunities, 
since, they can always refuse bets from arbitrageurs or other informed bettors.   
By contrast, BBBs, whose profits are maximised by increasing turnover, have 
little incentive to restrict informed customers. Consequently, informed bettors are likely 
to have access only to BBBs in order to place large stakes (or, to a much lesser 
degree, betting exchanges, where sufficient volume may only be available on some 
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events and where there are restrictions regarding the distribution of profit3). The 
implication of this is that information from skilled bettors is likely to be channelled 
through BBBs. The theories advocated by Levitt (2004), Kuypers (2000), Forrest and 
Simmons (2008) and Franck, et al. (2010) would suggest that this should have no 
impact on the prices of PTBs. In particular, Levitt (2004) argues they are superior 
forecasters to bettors and adjusting their odds in line with betting turnover would 
therefore be likely to reduce their profits. Equally, Kuypers (2000), Forrest and 
Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2010) argue that their price inefficiencies are 
intentional.  
It should be clear, however, that by eliminating skilled bettors, PTBs lose direct 
access to the only market players likely to yield superior forecasts to their own, 
something that would help PTBs move their odds closer to the objective probabilities; 
thereby enabling them to gain a higher margin from their clients (i.e. casual bettors). 
As such, we would anticipate that if PTBs believe that their odds can be improved, 
based on information arising from the informed bettors, they are likely to adjust their 
odds according to BBBs price changes. Forrest (2012), based on anecdotal 
information, suggests that PTB’s odds do indeed follow trends in Asian bookmakers’ 
odds, and our aim is formally to test this proposition. 
To explore the issues raised in the preceding discussion, we develop three 
hypotheses. First, we examine to what extent there is evidence that the actions of 
BBBs and PTBs differ systematically in terms of how frequently they adjust their odds, 
based on the differences in operating approach outlined above. This gives rise to H1: 
 
3 According to its regulations, Betfair (the most popular betting-exchange) can withhold up to 60% of a winning 
player's profit (http://www.betfair.com/www/GBR/en/aboutUs/Betfair.Charges/). This is an obvious deterrent 




The BBBs change odds more frequently and charge lower transaction costs (over-
round) per unit stake bet than PTBs.  
As explained above, we expect that informed bettors are only likely to trade with 
the BBBs, whose odds will therefore reflect this information. We suggest that PTBs 
will use these odds to adjust their own, to ensure that their odds better reflect the true 
event probabilities. Consequently, we expect PTB’s odds to lag those of BBBs and we 
therefore test H2a: Odds changes at PTBs converge to lagged odds changes at BBBs 
(SBOBet), and H2b: Odds changes at BBBs are not influenced by lagged odds of 
PTBs.  
Levitt (2004) argues that PTBs are superior forecasters (cf. their customers) of 
match results, suggesting that their final odds will also be superior predictors of event 
probabilities. However, if we find evidence to support H2a and H2b, we expect closing 
odds of PTBs to be influenced by BBBs early odds, whereas the closing odds of BBBs 
to be unrelated to those of PTBs. Consequently, we test H2c: The closing odds of 
PTBs will be related to both their own early odds and the early odds of BBBs, whereas 
the closing odds of BBBs will be related to their own early odds, but not the early odds 
of PTB. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) would suggest that valuable information 
held by all bettors should influence odds over time. In the football market, as kick-off 
approaches, more of the relevant information related to match outcome is revealed 
(e.g. the teams’ final line-ups, weather conditions) and the maximum stakes accepted 
by BBBs increases significantly. Consequently, bettors who wish to avail themselves 
of the maximum information and volume (and this is likely to apply to the informed 
bettors) are likely to bet close to market close (kick-off).  As a result, we expect later 
odds to be more informative of match outcomes than earlier odds for both BBBs 
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(driven by the flow of smart money) and PTBs (following odds adjustments based on 
BBBs odds). However, because the informed bettors trade mainly with BBB, their 
closing odds are likely to be better predictors of match outcomes. Consequently, we 
test H3a: Closing odds will be better predictors of match outcomes than early odds, 
for both BBBs and PTBs, and H3b: Closing odds of BBBs (cf. PTBs) are better 
predictors of match outcomes. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Identifying typical BBB and PTB bookmakers 
To test our hypotheses, we collected time-stamped odds data from typical 
representatives of a PTB and a BBB, namely Ladbrokes (LAD) and SBOBet (SBO). In 
order to align our findings with the results presented in Grant et al., (2019), who 
identified the features which distinguish BBBs from PTB’s, we collected data from the 
2012/13 season. Importantly, also, the choice of this season enables us to capture the 
effects of new entry and a transformed market setting early in the period where co-
existence of PTBs and BBBs on a non-trivial scale had become clearly established.  
We now provide a brief overview of the operations of LAD and SBO in 2012, 
which clearly identify them as a PTB and a BBB, respectively.  
LAD is a traditional UK bookmaker (incorporated in Gibraltar), founded in 1886, 
with over 16,000 employees, and it claims to be the most recognised betting brand in 
the United Kingdom.4 It operates more than 2,800 retail-betting shops in the UK, 
Ireland, Belgium, and Spain and attracts over 1 million active clients.5 Its financial 
statements in 2012, indicate that they laid £17 billion in bets across all events, resulting 
 




in net revenue of over £1 billion.. LAD offers a diversified range of gambling services, 
including racing, sports and political betting, online casino games, poker, bingo, and 
in-shop slot machines. It is likely that LAD uses sports betting to attract customers to 
these other (less-risky) operations. Its 2012 annual report indicates that customer 
acquisition costs were £107 per customer, inclusive of promotions and bonuses.  
Franck et al. (2013, p. 311) point out that LAD actively discourages informed 
bettors, ‘reserv[ing] the right to refuse part or all of a bet’ and use historical trades 
(e.g., via cookies, log files, clear gifs) to create customer profiles to identify and restrict 
the activities of potential arbitrageurs or informed bettors who generally bet when odds 
are favourable. Policies such as these allow LAD to operate under the high-margin, 
low-turnover model of the traditional PTB. 
LAD notes under ‘key risks’ in its 2012 annual report (p. 23): “the online 
gambling market is characterized by intense and substantial competition and by 
relatively low barriers to entry for new participants. In addition, LAD faces competition 
from market participants who benefit from greater liquidity as a result of accepting bets 
from jurisdictions in which LAD chooses not to operate.” These restricted territories 
include China. As Forrest (2012) notes, much of the betting on football now comes 
from South-East Asia (directly or indirectly), and LAD appears to have made the 
conscious decision not to compete with the Asian bookmaking market.6 The 2012 
Annual Report also notes (p. 24) that the company faces “a relatively high fixed-cost 
base as a proportion of total costs, consisting primarily of employee, rental and content 
costs associated with the betting shop estate.” Although LAD’s high physical presence 
in the market is not necessarily a driver of its odds-setting process, it does illustrate 
 
6 The website analytics service, Alexa, reported on Sept. 11, 2013, that 56% of the traffic to Ladbrokes website 
came from the UK, with 5% from the USA, followed by minor percentages of traffic from elsewhere. 
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that it is unlikely to be able to operate at the ultra-efficient levels of an online-only 
sports betting agency.  
SBOBet (the first three letters standing for “Sports Bookie Online”) is a major 
online bookmaker licensed in the Phillipines and Isle of Man. It is a subsidiary company 
of Celton Manx, Ltd, a private company, founded in 2008. As such, there is less 
publicly available information relating to its history and profitability or its specific 
operations.  
The Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) Report (2012) 
presents a detailed analysis of betting markets in Asia. It identifies SBO as one of the 
four major Asian players, and notes (p. 44) that it ‘represents heritage of an activity 
begun in 1994 in Singapore that spread to Malaysia, Indonesia and then the 
Philippines, where the sports betting business acquired an online betting licence in the 
economic area of Cagyan, a lax jurisdiction.’ The web analytics service, Alexa, reveals 
that the majority of visitors to SBOBet.com hail from South-East Asia. However, the 
few Asian online bookmaker sites represent the over-ground section of a vast pyramid 
(IRIS 2012). SBO represents the highest level of a large pool of regional bookmakers, 
which collect bets from the wider population through a set of localized bookmakers 
which hedge their own risks online. Hence, SBO regularly accept very large bets, as 
an amalgamation of a portfolio of small bets. The IRIS report (2012) notes that ‘these 
sites offer a particularly high rate of return to the bettor (around 97%), the low margin 
being offset by the very high volume of bets.’ The figures quoted suggest that a client 
can place a stake with one of the large Asian bookmakers of around 20 times the 




SBO differs from most European bookmakers in that it publishes the maximum 
amount it is willing to accept on an outcome. If bettors were to seek a larger stake, it 
would create an imbalance in SBO’s liabilities. In reporting market depth, SBO shows 
that it is relatively indifferent to the identity of the counterparty. The lack of 
discrimination in counterparties, and the more transparent structure, underpins 
identification of SBO as a BBB. 
 
4.2. Betting data 
We analyse time-stamped home team, draw, and away team (1x2) odds collected  
from both  LAD and SBO, at points 1 day, 16 hours, 8 hours, 4 hours, 2 hours, 1 hour, 
30 minutes and 1 second prior to kick-off for all 2132 football matches played in season 
2012/13 in the 6 most prominent European football leagues: The English Premier 
League, the Spanish La Liga, the Italian Serie A, the German Bundesliga, the French 
Ligue 1 and the Dutch Eredivisie. This resulted in a total of 51, 168 [2,132 × 8 (time 
points) x 3 (1x2 outcomes)] individual odds offers per bookmaker on potential game 
outcomes.7  
We posted requests to the bookmakers’ servers to obtain the data and decided 
on eight time points at which to collect odds, to trade-off between data availability and 
reliability. Increasing the number of time points per game would have increased the 
number of requests we made to the bookmakers’ servers, posing the risk that the 
bookmakers might restrict our access to their websites. The volume of betting tends 
to increase as match kick-off approaches. Consequently, we collected data at smaller 
 
7 Although the traditional match outcome (Home team win, draw, away team win) betting is most popular in 
Europe, SBO specialises in Asian Handicaps. We chose to use match outcome data as these were most likely to 
be liquid at the position-taker, and hence most likely to lead to reliable odds movements.  
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intervals in time as kick-off approached, in order to capture a similar amount of betting 
activity within each period.  
 
4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Differences between bookmakers  
Calculation of transaction costs for each bookmaker 
The level of transaction costs for each bookmaker (‘over-round’) is measured 
by the extent to which the sum of their odds-implied probabilities across all match 
outcomes exceeds unity. We measure the over-round, 𝜌𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, at each time point, 𝑡 in 
the lead-up to game 𝑖, for each bookmaker 𝑘 ∈  {𝑆𝐵𝑂, 𝐿𝐴𝐷}, by adding the inverse of 
the gross payoffs per dollar bet 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 for each of the three outcomes 𝑜 ∈ 𝐸 = {𝐻, 𝐷, 𝐴} 
in the football match (𝐻 denoting home win, 𝐷 denoting draw, and 𝐴 denoting away 
win): 
 









− 1 (1) 
 
 The average overround, ?̅?𝑘,𝑡 for each bookmaker, across all matches, for all points in 
time is computed and the bookmakers’ average trading costs are compared using the 














𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝐿𝐴𝐷 =  √
(𝑛1 − 1)𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂
2 + (𝑛2 − 1)𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐷
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is the estimate of the common standard deviation of the two samples, and 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 
are the number of observed matches for SBO and LAD, respectively. Our first 
hypothesis predicts that the transaction costs for SBO should be significantly lower 
than their PTB counterpart, LAD; i.e. the test statistic T should be significantly 
negative. 
 
Estimation of Frequency of Odds 
 We calculated the average frequency of odds changes per game across the 
sample in order to test whether the BBB (cf. PTB) moves its odds significantly more 
often. First, we calculate the difference in prices for each bookmaker for each match-
outcome-time point: 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 =  𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1,𝑜  
As we are only interested at this point in whether the odds move, rather than the actual 
size of the movement, we tally each match-outcome-time point based on a categorical 
score, 𝑀𝑖,𝑘𝑡,𝑜:  
 𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 = 1   𝑖𝑓   ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 ≠ 0  
𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 = 0   𝑖𝑓   ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡,𝑜 = 0
 (3) 
A binomial test is carried out to determine if the frequency of odds movements at SBO 








4.3.2. Transmission of Information within the Market  
Serial Correlation in Odds Movement  
 We conduct unit-root tests to determine whether the first-ordered differences in 
the bookmakers’ odds are stationary and utilize the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), in order to conclude how many lags are appropriate for further analysis of 
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changes in odds. It could be argued, for example, that a greater frequency of odds 
movements does not imply anything beyond noise around the bookmakers’ true 
probabilities. Odds movements then may be related to small changes in bookmaker 
liability, rather than information-based price moves, and the time series of odds 
movements would be unpredictable based on information arising from odds at 
previous time-points. Alternatively, if information were driving price movements, we 
would expect lagged movements to be important in predicting odds changes. 
Moreover, the time series of price movements may exhibit higher degrees of serial 
correlation if bookmakers’ odds either underreact or overreact to information flowing 
from bettors. 
Odds movements across outcomes within games are complementary, 
inasmuch as an increase in odds on the favourite winning will generally coincide with 
a decrease in odds on the longshot winning. Draw outcomes are notoriously difficult 
to predict for both experts and models (e.g. Pope and Peel, 1989; Goddard, 2005). 
Moreover, movements in draw odds are similarly likely to be driven by bets on one of 
the other outcomes, rather than based on specific information concerning the 
likelihood of this outcome. Thus, we restrict our analysis to only the favoured team 
(defined as the team with the higher gross payoff-reciprocal, or odds-implied 
probability at SBO, one-day before kick-off in each game8). 
We conduct a Fisher-type unit root test on panel data (Choi, 2001) for each 
bookmaker separately to test odds movements for stationarity. Each panel consists of 
match-time point observations of bookmaker odds. We use the BIC to find the optimal 
 
8 In our dataset, there are no cases in which the draw is the favoured outcome. We take the odds one day 
before kick-off to determine the favourite in case the favoured team changes in the lead-up to kick-off. 
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number of lags to include in our regression model to test H2; allowing a trade-off 
between model fit and parsimony. 
 
Modelling Odds Movements  
 In order to test H2a, that PTBs’ odds converge to those of BBBs and H2b, that 
BBBs’ odds are not influenced by PTBs’ odds, we employ a random-effects model. A 
random effects model is chosen to account for any unobserved variation in odds due 
to match-specific factors. As with the examination of lag length, the panel in the 
random-effects model consists of match-time observation points for each bookmaker. 
The general form of the random-effects models is as shown in Equations (4a) and 
(4b): 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂
+ 𝑏21𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏22𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + ⋯  
+ 𝑏𝑛2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏𝑛2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(4a) 
 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂 = 𝑐 + 𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷
+ 𝑏21𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏22𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + ⋯  
+ 𝑏𝑛2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏𝑛2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑆𝐵𝑂 +  𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
(4b) 
where ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 (i.e. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷) and ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂(i. e. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂) are the 
first differences in odds for the favoured team at LAD and SBO, respectively, 𝑈𝑖 is the 
game-specific error term, accounting for unobserved random variation across games, 
and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the i.i.d. error term from the regression. We reduce the generalised form of 
the model to a parsimonious form, with the appropriate number of lagged terms of 











 ) + 𝑔 ln 𝑛 (5) 
where 𝑛 is the number of observations9,∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 is the realised first difference in odds 
between time 𝑡 − 1 and time 𝑡 at bookmaker 𝑘, and 𝑔 is the degrees of freedom (the 
number of parameters in the model minus one.) The first term in the BIC penalises 
poor model fit, while the second term penalises the number of parameters required to 
achieve the model fit. Thus, a smaller value of the BIC means the model is preferred. 
We expect that the models described by Eqs. (4a) and (4b) can be simplified. 
In particular, since H2 is concerned with whether a particular bookmaker’s prices will 
converge to those of the other bookmaker, we expect the difference in the two 
bookmakers’ prices in the previous lag to be the main determinant of odds. Therefore, 
Eq (3) should reduce to: 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝐵(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷) + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (6a) 
 ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂 = 𝑐 + 𝐵(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂) + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (6b) 
where 𝐵 is a positive coefficient indicating the degree of convergence of the 
bookmaker whose odds-changes are being forecast to those of the other bookmaker. 
For example, in Eq. (6a) the coefficient 𝐵 indicates the degree of convergence of 
LAD’s odds to those of SBO. 
As we suspect that informed bettors can only access BBBs, we expect that 
prices in that market will reflect quality information, which is unavailable directly to 
PTBs. Therefore, the latter are expected to react to odds changes in the BBBs’ market 
and adjust their odds when these deviate from those offered by BBB. Therefore, we 
expect a significantly positive value for B when we estimate Eq.(6a). Similarly, Eq.(6b) 
 
9 It is debatable whether this should be the number of observations or the number of groups in a panel data 
set. Here, due to the low correlation of the ‘within-panel’ odds-differences, we chose the former. 
21 
 
tests the influence of LAD’s odds on the odds changes of SBO. If the informed traders 
are driving the market, support for H2b would be found if 𝐵 in Eq.(6b) is close to zero. 
Alternatively, if bookmakers are the most accurate forecasters of sports events (Levitt, 
2004), there should be little convergence from PTBs to BBBs’ odds (i.e. the coefficient 
𝐵 would be close to zero in Eq.(6a)).  
 
Early-to-Late Odds Movements between Bookmakers 
To further test our view that odds of PTBs are driven by movements in BBBs 
odds (but not vice versa), we examine whether the PTB’s closing prices are related to 
early prices of themselves and the BBB, whereas the BBB’s closing prices are only 
related to their own early prices. To achieve this, we utilize a fixed-effects approach, 
incorporating normalized odds-implied probabilities for all three outcomes along one 
dimension of the panel, and all games along the other. 
First, both bookmakers’ payoffs (𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜) one day before kickoff (time 𝑡0) and at 
the time one second before kick-off (time 𝑇) are converted to normalised probabilities 
(𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜). We achieve this by dividing bookmaker 𝑘’s payoff reciprocal for outcome o by 







The fixed-effects models used to test the information content of odds takes the 
following form:  
 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜 (7a) 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜 (7b) 
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where for outcome 𝑜 in game 𝑖, 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜and 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 are, 
respectively, the normalized probabilities implied in the final odds of LAD,  in the day-
ahead odds of LAD, in the day-ahead odds of SBO, and in the final odds of SBO, 𝛼𝑖 
is the unobserved game-specific effect from the fixed-effects model, and 𝑢𝑖𝑜 is the i.i.d. 
white noise error term.  
 The models in Eq.(7a) and Eq.(7b) help test the influence of the early SBO odds 
on the terminal odds of LAD and the influence of early LAD odds on the terminal odds 
of SBO, respectively. If, as we suspect, the influence of informed bets at the BBB 
drives the odds in the PTB’s market, whereas the PTB’s odds do not influence the 
BBB, then 𝛽2 in Eq. 7a should be significant and positive, and the coefficient 𝛽1 in Eq. 
7b should be close to 1, while the coefficient 𝛽2 should be insignificant and close to 
zero.  
 Due to the expected high correlation between the explanatory variables in these 
models, we also test whether the nested model in (7c), excluding 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 , provides 
a better fit than the unrestricted version in (7a), evaluated using the BIC in (5): 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜 (7c) 
 
4.3.3. The Efficiency of Odds-Based Estimates  
According to H3a and 3b, bookmakers’ closing odds are expected to be more 
efficient predictors of actual game outcomes compared to early odds and BBBs’ odds 
are expected to be more accurate than those of the PTBs. To test these hypotheses, 
we estimate conditional logit (CL) models (McFadden, 1974); these have been used 
to test the efficiency of odds in many previous betting studies (e.g., Bolton and 
Chapman, 1986; Benter, 1994; Sung and Johnson, 2010). The CL model is used with 
only odds as an explanatory variable, and takes the following form, where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 is the 
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probability of the outcome 𝐸 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐷, 𝐴} occurring in game 𝑖 at time 𝑡, with odds on 
outcome 𝑜 from bookmaker 𝑘: 
 





 𝑍𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 = 𝑏 ln(𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜) (8b) 
We estimate model (8a) for each bookmaker at times 𝑡0 one day prior to kick-off and 
𝑇, one second before kickoff. The model fit is evaluated using McFadden’s (1974) 
pseudo-R2 statistic; a higher pseudo-R2 implying a superior model fit. Support for H3a 
would arise if earlier odds have less explanatory power than later odds (i.e. if the model 
fit at time 𝑇 is greater than at time 𝑡0 for both bookmakers).  Support for H3b would be 
given if the model fit is higher for SBO cf. LAD at times 𝑡0 and 𝑇). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Differences between Bookmakers 
Our results clearly demonstrate that SBO odds are subject to more changes than LAD 
odds. In the first three columns of Table 1 we show the proportion of occasions in 
various time intervals prior to kick off when LAD and SBO changed their odds. It is 
clear from this table that SBO (cf. LAD) change their odds more frequently in a given 
time interval prior to a kick-off. This is confirmed by the difference in the mean number 
of odds changes across time intervals during the 24 hours prior to the game between 
SBO (5.36 per match, SD= 1.03) and LAD (0.795 per match, SD= 1.24). A t-test 
confirmed that the difference is unlikely to be random (p-value= 0.000). These results 
provide strong support for our view, expressed in H1, that BBBs change their odds 
more frequently than PTBs and confirms the view of Levitt (2004) that PTBs rarely 




Table 1: Average over-round and proportion of occasions when LAD and SBO changed their 








Time period prior 




over 1 day-16 hrs  0.09 0.64 0.077 0.073 
16 to 8 hrs  0.11 0.75 0.077 0.070 
8hrs to 4 hrs  0.22 0.86 0.077 0.070 
4hrs to 2 hrs  0.15  0.77 0.077 0.065 
2hrs to 1hr  0.09 0.73 0.077 0.064 
1hr to 30 mins.  0.09 0.78 0.077 0.064 
(5 mins to 1 sec)  0.14 0.87 0.077 0.064 
 
 
 In columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, we present results regarding the bookmakers’ 
over-rounds (calculated using Eq.(1)) at various stages of the market. The t-tests 
confirm that SBO (cf. LAD) clearly operate with a lower over-round at all points in time, 
and the difference in over-round increases as the kick-off approaches. These results 
provide support for the view, expressed in H1, that BBBs operate with lower margins 
than PTBs; the lower margin operated by BBBs generating higher volumes, as more 
informed traders are attracted by more advantageous odds.  
 
5.2. Transmission of Information from Bettors to Bookmakers 
The results of the Fisher type unit-root test, presented in Table 2, show that the 
first differences in the odds are stationary for both SBO and LAD. Therefore, we 




Table 2: Fisher-Type Unit-Root test statistics for the four stationarity tests described by Choi 
(2001), with Ho: The panels contain a unit-root.  
 


























We apply the BIC in order to identify the optimal number of lags, trading-off between 
fit and complexity. The results are presented in Table 3. For SBO (Panel A), the model 
producing the lowest BIC value (-9,075) is that incorporating the constant term only, 
and thus Equation (4b) is best modelled using ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂 = 𝑐. The model incorporating 
the lagged odds terms from both SBO and LAD, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂 = 𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 +
𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂, produces a significantly worse BIC (-9,062, p-value 0.002). This implies 
that odds movements at SBO are not related to previous odds movements in either 
SBO or LAD prices, or at least there is no improvement in forecasting power from 














Table 3: Results related to model selection for odds changes at SBO and LAD.  
The first column shows the right-hand side of the non-nested model under consideration, with 
one, two, and three lags of each bookmaker’s odds used, respectively. The second and third 
columns report the BIC and R2 of the non-nested model, respectively. The fourth column 
shows the nested model under consideration (i.e. the nested model having produced the lowest 
current BIC value). The fifth column reports the BIC of the nested model. The final column 
reports the significance of the difference in BIC values, calculated as p-value = 
exp{(BIClower − BIChigher) 2⁄ }. 
 
Panel A: Model Selection for Odds Changes at SBO. 
Dependent Variable: Change in Prices at SBO (∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐵𝑂) 
Non-Nested Model BIC Model R2 Nested Model BIC p-value*  












𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
+𝑏21𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏22𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
-6,068 0.30% 𝑐 -6,082 0.001 
𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
+𝑏21𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏22𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
+𝑏31𝑋𝑖,𝑡−3,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏32𝑋𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
-3,509 0.55% 𝑐 -3,510 0.479 
 
 
Panel B: Model Selection for Odds Changes at LAD. 
Dependent Variable: Change in Prices at LAD (∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷) 
Non-Nested Model BIC 
Model 
R2 
Nested Model BIC 
p-
value* 
𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 -53,973 8.75% 𝑐 -52,822 0.000 
𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 






𝑐 +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
+𝑏21𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏22𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
+𝑏31 






*Lower BIC model better than higher BIC model 
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Examination of the models’ BICs estimated for changes in LAD odds, shows 
that there may be marginal improvement over the single-lag model by adding in 
second- and third-lags of both LAD and SBO odds. For example, the second row of 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the BICs of the models with two and one lags are -
45,102 and -45,051, respectively. However, the marginal improvement in model fit, 
although significant (p-value of 0.000), reduces the sample size significantly (by 12.5% 
for each additional lag). Consequently, we retain the single lag specification for 
modelling the changes in LAD odds.  
 We present the results of estimating the random-effects model in Eq. (4a), using 
one period lagged odds from both bookmakers as the independent variables, in Table 
4. The coefficients for the lagged odds for the two bookmakers are nearly identical in 
magnitude, but with opposing signs. Rearranging the model:  
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷
= 𝑐 + 𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(9a) 
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + (1 + 𝑏11)𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂+ 𝑈𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(9b) 
 Now, if 𝑏12 ≈ −𝑏11    
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑏12)𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂+ 𝑈𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(9c) 
Consequently, the results presented in Table 4, suggest that at any time up to kick-
off, around 9.5% of the odds at LAD can be explained by the lagged odds at SBO, 
while the remaining 90.5% are explained by the lagged odds at LAD. Importantly, the 
coefficient of SBO’s lagged odds is positive and significant at the 1% level. Hence, 




Table 4: Results of estimating the random effects panel model. 
 This table reports the coefficients resulting from estimating regression model 4a with one lag: 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 indicates the gross odds 𝑋 
offered on game 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by bookmaker 𝑘, on the favoured outcome. The coefficient and 
corresponding standard errors are reported in the second column, the third column shows the 
significance level of each coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and (***) denoting significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The fourth column shows the p-value of the Z- 
statistic. The standard deviation due to the random-effects design is 𝜎𝑈 and the standard 
deviation due to the white noise error term is 𝜎𝐸. 
 
  Coefficient 
Sig. Z-Stat.  (P-value) 
  
  (Std. Error)   
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 
-0.09515 (***) -33.32  (0.0000)   
(0.0029)      
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
0.09150 (***) 34.44    (0.0000)   
(0.0027)      
𝑐 
0.002145 (**) 1.91       (0.0560)   
(0.0011)      
𝜎𝑈 0.0059   
 
  




(Fraction of Variance due to 𝑈𝑖) 0.0474   
R2 
 
n. observations 12,785  Within 0.0933 
n. groups 1,868  Between 0.1690 
Wald χ2(2) 1,192.03 (***) Overall 0.0874 
 
 
This model produces a relatively low R2 value (8.74%), partially because in 
most cases LAD do not change their odds, i.e. ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 0 . This leads us to 
undertake further analysis of the cases in which LAD’s odds have moved, i.e. when  
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 ≠ 0, which occurs in 966 matches (with 1,572 odds movements). We estimate 
the model represented by Eq. 4a with one lag and we present the results in Table 5. 
The increase in the magnitude of the coefficients when examining cases for which 
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LAD’s odds move is substantial; nearly 50% of the variation in LAD’s odds moves can 
be explained by the deviation of their lagged odds from those of SBO. In addition, the 
R2 of the model has increased significantly to 49.89% (from 8.74%).  These results 
provide strong support for the view that a key driver for PTBs to change their odds are 
differences between their odds and those of BBBs.  
Table 5: Results of estimating the random effects panel model for the sample of 966 European 
football matches at time points for which LAD’s odds moved, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 ≠ 0.  
This table reports the coefficients from estimating the following regression model (Eq. 4a with 
one lag): ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝑏11𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 + 𝑏12𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, where𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 indicates the gross 
odds 𝑋 offered on game 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by bookmaker 𝑘, on the favoured outcome.  The coefficient 
and corresponding standard errors are reported in the second column, the third column shows 
the significance level of each coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and (***) denoting 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The fourth column shows the p-value 
of the statistic. The standard deviation due to the random-effects design is 𝜎𝑈 and the standard 
deviation due to the white noise error term is 𝜎𝑒. 
 
 Coefficient 
Sig. Z-Stat.  (p-value) 
  
 (Std. Error)   
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 
0.5146 (***) -35.19  (0.0000)   
(0.0136)      
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 
-0.5225 (***) 37.95  (0.0000)   
(0.0148)      
𝑐 
-0.0088   -1.06  (0.2880)   
(0.0083)      
𝜎𝑈 0.0422   
 
  




(Fraction of Variance due to 𝑈𝑖) 0.4767   
R2 
 
n. observations 1,572   Within 0.3280 
n. groups 966   Between 0.5819 





To further test Hypothesis 2a, we model the change in LAD’s odds, for the restricted 
sample of 1,572 occasions when their odds did move, against the lagged difference in 
SBO’s and LAD’s prices (𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷) directly. We present the results of 
estimating this model in Table 6. The single-factor specification shows a similar 
magnitude of coefficients; with about 50% of the movement in LAD’s odds explained 
by the lagged difference in SBO’s and LAD’s odds.  
 
Table 6: Results of estimating the random effects panel model for the sample of 966 European 
football matches which involve periods when LAD’s odds did move, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 ≠ 0. This table 
reports the coefficients from equation 4a with one lag: ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝐿𝐴𝐷 = 𝑐 + 𝐵(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 −
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷) + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 indicates the gross odds 𝑋 offered on game 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by 
bookmaker 𝑘, on the favoured outcome.  The coefficient and corresponding standard errors 
are reported in the second column, the third column shows the significance level of each 
coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. The fourth column shows the p-value of the Z-statistic. The standard 
deviation due to the random-effects design is 𝜎𝑈 and the standard deviation due to the white 
noise error term is 𝜎𝐸. 
  Coefficient  Sig. Z-Stat.  (P-value)   
  (Std. Error)   
 
  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑆𝐵𝑂 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,𝐿𝐴𝐷 
0.5038 (***) 38.91  (0.0000)   




-0.0234 (***) -12.80  (0.0000)   
(0.0018)   
 
  
𝜎𝑈 0.0367   
 
  




(Fraction of Variance due to 𝑈𝑖) 0.3476   
R2 
n. observations 1,572   Within 0.3210 
n. groups 966   Between 0.5828 





 The results reported in Table 6, show a significantly negative sign for the 
constant on the random-effects regression, suggesting that a bettor’s payoff for a 
winning bet with LAD is typically slightly lower than they could have obtained with SBO 
on the same favoured outcome (largely due to the differences in over-round). Thus, if 
LAD’s odds were below (above) SBO’s odds in the previous period, we expect less 
(more) than half of the difference to be made up by the change in odds at LAD. For 
example, if at 𝑡 − 1, SBO and LAD were offering gross odds of $1.90 and $1.70, 
respectively, the results suggest that LAD’s prices at time 𝑡 would be $1.70 + 
0.5038($1.90 - $1.70) – 0.0234 ≈ $1.78. The predicted price would also be $1.78 at 
time 𝑡 if LAD were offering $1.90 and SBO were offering $1.70 at time 𝑡 − 1. These 
results therefore support H2a, suggesting that when a PTB moves its prices, it does 
so towards BBB’s odds. If we can demonstrate that BBB’s (cf. PTB’s) odds discount 
more information concerning match outcome, this will support our view that information 
arising from informed bettors is indirectly transmitted to PTBs, via BBB’s odds. 
 
5.3. The Relative Efficiency of Odds-Based Forecasts 
We present the results of the estimation of Eq. (7a) and (7b), using, 
respectively, last-minute odds of LAD and SBO as the dependent variables in Tables 









Table 7: Results of estimating the fixed effects regression model (Eq. 7a).  
The coefficients and corresponding standard errors are reported in the second column, the 
third column shows the significance level of each coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and 
(***) denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The fourth column 
shows the p-value of the statistic. The standard deviation due to the fixed-effects design is 𝜎𝐴 
and the standard deviation due to the white noise error term is 𝜎𝐸. 
 
Bookmaker’s odds-implied probabilities 
one day before kickoff 
Coefficient Sig. P-value   




0.4618 (***) (0.0000)   




0.5547 (***) (0.0000)   




-0.0040 (***) (0.0000)   
(0.0010)   
 
  
𝜎𝐴 0.0060   
 
  




(Fraction of Variance due to 𝛼𝑖) 0.0612   
R2 
n. observations 3,397   Within 0.9921 
n. groups 1,700   Between 0.9426 













Table 8: Results of estimating the fixed effects regression model (Eq. 7b) with the odds-
implied probabilities of SBOBet 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 as dependent variable and the day-ahead odds-
implied probabilities of LAD and the day-ahead odds-implied probabilities of SBO as 
independent variables, using the full sample of 2132 European football matches: 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 =
𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜, where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 indicates the odds-implied probability 𝑌 
offered on game 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by bookmaker 𝑘, on match outcomes 𝑜.  The coefficients and 
corresponding standard errors are reported in the second column, the third column shows the 
significance level of each coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and (***) denoting significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The fourth column shows the p-value of the statistic. 
The standard deviation due to the fixed-effects design is 𝜎𝐴 and the standard deviation due to 
the white noise error term is 𝜎𝐸. 
 
Bookmaker’s odds-implied probabilities 
one day before kickoff 


























(Fraction of Variance due to 𝛼𝑖) 0.0796 
 
R2 
n. observations 3,397 
 
Within 0.9673 
n. groups 1,700 
 
Between 0.7399 










It is evident that early odds posted by SBO do exhibit significant forecasting 
power in predicting closing LAD odds, whereas the converse is not true. In particular, 
the results presented in Table 7 show that the early odds-implied probabilities of match 
outcome from SBO, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜, are highly significant in predicting the closing LAD’s 
odds-implied probabilities, 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜; the coefficient (0.4618), indicating that closing 
LAD’s odds converge, on average, about halfway towards early SBO odds. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 8 show that the closing odds of SBO are unrelated 
to the early odds of LAD. Consequently, LAD’s price adjustments appear to be 
influenced by the prices in the BBB market, whereas SBO’s odds moves are not 
predictable; providing further support for H2a and H2b. 
As a further robustness check, we present the results of estimating a fixed 
effects model of the closing LAD’s odds-implied probabilities at kick-off as a function 
of the early LAD’s odds implied probabilities only (see Table 9). As we expected, the 
coefficient of the early LAD’s probabilities is very close to 1 when no other variables 
are added to the model. However, when comparing this model to that presented in 
Table 7, the improvement in forecasting power by adding the SBO’s odds-implied 
probabilities is clearly shown (a likelihood-ratio test exploring if the model in Table 7 
nests the model in Table 9, is emphatically rejected: χ2(1) = 615.87, p-value = 0.000). 
Hence, we conclude that SBO’s odds are a significant determinant of the odds posted 
by LAD at kick-off. 
 In order to test the forecasting power of different sets of odds for predicting the 
outcome of football games (H 3a and 3b), we estimate Eqs. (8a) and (8b), using the 
early and late (log of) odds-implied probabilities from the two bookmakers (see Table 
10).  The magnitude of the coefficients (around 1.10) and their standard errors (0.50)  
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indicates that each of the odds sets imply a small bias towards pricing favourites (e.g. 
Bacon-Shone et al, 1992). 
Table 9: The Results of estimating the fixed effects regression model (Eq. 7b) with closing 
odds-implied probabilities of LAD 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 as dependent variable and the day-ahead odds-
implied probabilities of LAD as independent variable, using the full sample of 2132 European 
football matches:  𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜, where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 indicates the odds-
implied probability 𝑌 offered on game 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by bookmaker 𝑘, on all match outcomes 𝑜.  
The coefficient and corresponding standard errors are reported in the second column, the 
third column shows the significance level of each coefficient in the regression: (*), (**), and 
(***)  denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The fourth column 
shows the p-value of the statistic. The standard deviation due to the fixed-effects design is 𝜎𝐴 
and the standard deviation due to the white noise error term is 𝜎𝐸. 
Bookmaker’s Odds-Implied Probabilities 
One Day Before Kickoff 
Coefficient Sig. P-value   




1.0076 (***) (0.0000)   




-0.0026 (**) (0.0140)   
(0.0011)       
𝜎𝐴 0.0057       
𝜎𝑒 0.0258       
𝜌  
(Fraction of Variance due to 𝛼𝑖) 0.0469   
R2 
n. observations 3,397   Within 0.9905 
n. groups 1,700   Between 0.9486 
F(2, 1695) 176,287 (***) Overall 0.9897 
 
 
Although the odds-implied forecasts are highly correlated, the Psuedo-R2 is 
higher and the BIC lower, for later odds (bottom half of Table 10) than for earlier odds 
(top half of the Table 10), at both SBO and LAD. The BICs are formally compared 








where 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 are, respectively, the models with the lower and higher 
observed BIC values. The improvement in the BIC value for late vs. early odds is 
significant for both SBO (p-value =0.000) and LAD (p-value = 0.020). This confirms H 
3a; later odds are more efficient for both types of bookmaker.  
 
Table 10: Results of comparing the efficiency of bookmaker’s odds using CL models. The 






, where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 is the event home win, draw, or away win (one of which is 1 for each 
game 𝑖), with odds from bookmaker 𝑘 at time 𝑡 for outcome 𝑜, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜 = 𝑏 ln(𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑘,𝑜) (i.e. the 
logged odds-implied probabilities for each game 𝑖).  
 
Bookmaker Coef.   
  
Bookmaker Coef. 
    
(time pre kick-off) (SE)  p-value Pseudo-R2 (time pre kick-off) (SE)  p-value Pseudo-R2 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 
SBO (-1 day) 
1.1283 (0.000) 0.1087 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 
LAD (- 1 day) 
1.0996 (0.000) 0.1072 
(0.0588)     (0.0571)     
BIC 3,623   BIC 3,630   
𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝑆𝐵𝑂,𝑜 
SBO (-1 second) 
1.1111 (0.000) 0.1123 𝑌𝑖,𝑇,𝐿𝐴𝐷,𝑜 
LAD (-1 second) 
1.0963 (0.000) 0.1092 
(0.0572)     (0.0565)     
BIC 3,609   BIC 3,622   
 
 
 We also compare the efficiency of the LAD’s and SBO’s late odds. We find, in 
line with H3b, that there is a relatively greater increase in efficiency from early to late 
odds at SBO than at LAD (pseudo R2 increases from 0.1087 to 0.1123 c.f. 0.1072 to 
0.1092). In addition, the difference in the efficiency of the late odds of these two 
bookmakers is substantial. We use the BIC comparison test from Eq. (10), to compare 
the efficiency of late odds at SBO and LAD and find that the former have a significantly 
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lower BIC value (p-value = 0.000).  Consequently, these results support H3b, that late 
odds at BBBs (cf. PTBs) are more efficient in predicting game outcomes.  
Taken together, these results suggest that SBO improves the accuracy of its 
odds by responding to information arising from informed traders, and LAD reacts to 
the trend in SBO’s odds, improving the predictive ability of its odds in turn. 
 
 6. Discussion 
The results confirm that bookmakers can be classified as PTBs and BBBs, with 
PTBs attracting an unsophisticated clientele and being willing to lose money in the 
short-run by either providing incentives to bet or promotional odds, to earn profits in 
the long run against its customer base as a whole. There is evidence that they actively 
maintain a book of unsophisticated clients by restricting or excluding those bettors who 
are believed to be superior traders. Hence, PTBs operate against a relatively 
uninformed clientele, which places small bets at high margins.  Our results also 
suggest that BBBs attract the bets of informed clients by operating under a regime of 
high-turnover and low margins. Prices at BBBs change regularly in response to the 
volume of bets made by clients as they move their prices in order to achieve a low, 
risk-free margin from a high volume of stakes.  
Our results confirm that LAD (a typical PTB) charges higher transaction costs 
(over-round), and moves prices less frequently than a typical BBB (SBO). When LAD’s 
prices do move, they tend to converge to SBO’s odds; lagged SBO prices explaining 
around 50% of LAD price movements. These results are consistent with informed 
traders moving BBBs’ prices, and this information slowly diffusing to the odds of PTBs. 
The actions of BBBs (e.g., lower transaction costs) seem to encourage informed 
traders to bet, resulting in significant information being transmitted from the informed 
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betting public to their odds. As a result, the efficiency of their odds substantially 
improves as the event draws nearer. This practice contrasts with that of PTBs, which 
discourage the activity of informed traders. However, PTBs tend to be influenced by 
trends in the BBBs’ odds, attempting to benefit indirectly from the flow of smart money 
in order to increase their odds’ efficiency (potentially gaining a higher margin from their 
casual clients).  
Overall, our results suggest that Levitt’s (2004) view that bookmakers set the 
market and are superior forecasters compared to bettors is certainly no longer true 
across the whole market. Levitt’s proposition, which is confined to the operation of 
PTBs, suggests that they have no incentive to react to price moves arising from a 
demand-driven market, as the betting public should not be able to improve on the 
bookmaker’s expert estimates. Consequently, even when PTBs do move their odds 
because of betting volume, Levitt’s argument would suggest that this can only be the 
result of risk-aversion rather than maximization of expected profit. As a result, this 
reaction should lead to less accurate estimations, as experts’ (seen as bookmakers 
by Levitt (2004)) forecasts are adjusted to the opinions of noise-traders. However, we 
show that the supply-side of the market is following a demand driven market (BBBs), 
shaped by the stakes of informed traders. Consequently, prices in these markets are 
effectively processing information from trading volumes, leading market prices 
towards efficiency. Thus, we conclude that the population of bettors, whilst involving 
many noise-traders, does in fact include informed traders who are capable of 
significantly improving the accuracy of the prices.  
Our results, therefore, suggest that a highly liquid globalized market such as 
the football betting market is capable of efficiently processing information arising from 
diverse global sources. This finding has broad implications. For example, it strongly 
39 
 
supports the value of prediction markets, since we show that provided liquidity is 
present, volume weighted average prices constitute more accurate estimations of 
unknown true probabilities (cf., those of expert forecasters).  
 
Finally, and importantly, whilst our study suggests that setting barriers to trade, 
such as the discrimination against skilled players, is likely to lead markets away from 
efficiency, the emergence of a strategic group which behaves more like book-
balancers, suggests that information from informed traders will, to some extent, be 
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